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SHOULD A TWO-YEAR-OLD TAKE
THE STAND?
In re C.R.K. v. R.J.K.'
Child sexual abuse is a serious national problem which has provoked a
great deal of public indignation in recent years. 2 The victims range from
newborn infants to older teenagers, and belong to all socioeconomic classes.
3
Although sexual abuse is only one variety of child abuse, there are approx-
imately 200,000 reported cases in the United States each year.4 Many au-
thorities believe the problem to be much worse; one survey showed that only
six percent of child sexual abuse cases were reported. 5 It is difficult to imagine
a more heinous or morally reprehensible crime, or one which elicits such a
storm of anger and disgust from the public, along with loud demands for
retribution.
1. 672 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
2. See generally THE MALTREATMENT OF T SCHOOL-AGED CHILD (R. Volpe,
M. Breton & J. Mitton eds. 1980) (causes and effects of abuse on school-aged chil-
dren); V. FONTANA & D. BEsHARov, THE MALTREATED CHILD (4th ed. 1979) (overview
of the pathology and psychology of child abuse); J. COSTA & G. NELSON, CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1978) (scholarly overview with an emphasis on rentedial meas-
ures, including a comprehensive compilation of state statutory reporting requirements
with names and addresses of agencies by county); S. NAGI, CHILD MALTREATNENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (1977) (discussion of demographic and socioeconomic aspects of
child abuse); H. J.mzs, THE LrrT VicTmus (1975) (individual case studies); THE
BATTERED CHILD (R. Helfer & C. Kempte 2d ed. 1974) (psychological aspects of child
abuse); L. YOUNG, WEDNESDAY'S CHILDREN (1964) (early seminal work on child abuse);
The Nightmare of the Sexually Abused Child, USA TODAY, Nov. 1985, at 54 (del-
eterious effects of sexual abuse on children and the epidemic nature of the problem);
California: Devilish Deeds?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 1985, at 43 (children forced to
participate in satanic worship rituals including infant torture and dismemberment);
Child Abuse at the Point?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 1985, at 45 (child sexual abuse in
U.S. military); Painful Secrets, TimE, July 1, 1985, at 51 (widespread pederasty by
priests); A Hidden Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 30 (prevalence of child
abuse and its difficulty of detection).
3. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 7-8 (1974-1975); James, supra note 2, at 102.
4. R. GEISER, HDDEN VicTrms: THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 6 (1979);
Rogers, Child Sexual Abuse and the Courts: Preliminary Findings, SOCIAL WORK
AND CHILD SExuAL ABusE 145 (1982).
5. Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Two-Way Closed Circuit Tel-
evision to Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 FORaAi L. REv.
995, 996 (1985).
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Public indignation puts pressure on the legal system to assure the swift
detection, conviction, and punishment of child sexual abusers. The nature
of the crime itself, however, makes prosecution difficult. 6 When the abuser
is a close relative, the victim is often unwilling to report the crime.7 The
abuser may use threats of physical harm or that "no one will believe you"
to coerce the child-victim into silence. Children are sometimes afraid to report
parental abuse because they fear that their family will break up or will be
reduced to poverty if the abuser, who may be the breadwinner, goes to jail.
Similar fears may move the spouse of an abusing parent to discourage the
child from reporting the abuse.8 Since child abuse--especially sexual abuse-
is almost always committed in a secluded place (a bedroom at home, a
deserted park or playground, an empty classroom), there are often no wit-
nesses to the crime except the victim.
Physical evidence may be scanty or nonexistent. An adult, particularly
one who is close to the child (a parent or other trusted relative), can exert
psychological coercion on a child to obtain participation in a sexually abusive
act, coercion which would not be effective against an adult, but which makes
the use of physical force unnecessary. 9 Thus evidence of resistance commonly
found in rape and adult sexual abuse cases (reddened wrists, bite marks,
scratches, etc.) may be nonexistent. By the time the incident comes to light,
it is not uncommon for weeks or months to have passed. 10 Finally, several
forms of sexual abuse simply do not produce physical evidence. For example,
if a child's genitals are fondled or orally stimulated, or if the child is forced
to fondle or orally stimulate an adult's genitals, there may be no medically
recognizable "symptoms" of any kind. Since physical evidence is lacking,
6. Id. at 1000; see also Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 WASH. L. REv.
303 (1962).
7. See H. JAmEs, supra note 2, at 101-07.
8. During the summer of 1985 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the author interviewed
several child victims of parental abuse and spouses of abusers who voiced this fear
as their reason for unwillingness to testify against an abusing breadwinner. See gen-
erally V. FONTANA & D. BEsHARov, supra note 2 (psychological factors which operate
to discourage reporting of abuse by child-victims).
9. SExUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLEScENTS 85-98 (A. Burgess ed.
1978).
10. There are statutes in all 50 states requiring that physical abuse of children
be reported to a designated state agency by those in positions of contact with children(teachers, social workers, pediatricians, etc.). See J. CosTA & G. NELsON, supra
note 2. However, much abuse, particularly sexual abuse (which may not leave physical
indications), only comes to light after the child reports the abuse to friends who
report it to their parents, who report it to authorities. Alternately, abuse may be
detected by a teacher who notices a difference in the child's behavior at school,
or observes bruises or other marks on the child, perhaps during a gym class. In
any event, there is delay in the abuse being brought to the attention of authorities,
which is not conducive to the prosecution of the abuser.
[Vol. 52
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testimony must be adduced from witnesses, and usually the abused child is
the only witness."
Adducing testimony from the child may mean subjecting the child to
the ordeal of appearing and testifying in court, seated perhaps only a few
feet away from the abuser. The child might endure the full rigors of cross-
examination, including perhaps such "tricks" as the defense layer positioning
himself in such a way that the child is forced to look at the defendant
throughout the proceedings.12 This is apt to be an extremely traumatic ex-
perience, perhaps as terrifying to the child as the original abuse. 13 Prosecutors
and parents are often reluctant to force an already traumatized child to
endure this type of trial by ordeal, and the child is often unwilling or unable
to endure it. Yet, the prosecutor and the indignant parent are faced with the
fact that, without testimony by the child, the case against the abuser may
collapse.
Through the case of In re C.R.K. v. H.J.K. 14 this Note explores the
problems and issues which arise when the victim of child abuse is the sole
witness to the crime. Topics examined include the competence requirements
pertaining to children's testimony and alternate means of introducing evi-
dence which eliminate the need for the young victim to testify personally in
court.
The victim in In re C.R.K. v. H.J.K. was a 2-year-old girl whose parents
were divorced. After returning from a visit with her father, C.R.K. reported
to her mother than Hank (the father) had "pinched her butt," pointing to
her vaginal area. 5 The mother testified that the child's vaginal area was red
and swollen after visits with the father, and that the child told her that
"Hank messed up my butt" and took a picture of her with her clothes off.'6
The mother took C.R.K. to a police detective, who gave the child an-
atomically correct dolls and observed her with the dolls for over an hour.
The detective testified that she undressed a doll and kissed it in the genital
area. In response to the question "who does that," C.R.K. replied, "Hank."'17
11. Even when physical evidence is present, it is generally only circumstantial
evidence that abuse has been committed. The eyewitness testimony of the child is
often the only direct link between the child and the offender. See Meyers, Little
,Witnesses, 11 STUDENT LAW. 14 (1982).
12. Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment: A Psychological Di-
lemma, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 109 (1984).
13. B. CABPmAN, Tim SExuAL OFFENDER AND His OrrENsEs 70 (1954); Chaneles,
Child Victims of Sexual Offenses, FED. PROBAMoN, June 1967, at 52, 54; Note,
Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without Testimony in Court, 15 U. MicH. J.L.
REF. 131, 132 n.6 (1981).
14. 672 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
15. Id. at 697.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 697-98.
1987]
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A few weeks later the court issued an order assuming custody of C.R.K.,
placing the child temporarily in the legal custody of the Missouri Division
of Family Services and in the physical custody of the mother. A few weeks
after this order, a psychiatrist testified that C.R.K. replied to the question
"what is Hank doing?" by pointing to her genitalia and saying that is where
he puts his finger and mouth. After two and one-half hours together, the
psychiatrist felt that there was a "strong possibility" of sexual abuse and
that the child was telling the truth. 8 At trial, after denying a motion by the
father requesting disqualification of the judge, the juvenile court found that
the natural father had sexually abused the child and ordered counseling and
supervised visitation. Pursuant to Missouri law, the father appealed the order,
objecting, inter alia, to the admission of hearsay testimony, i.e., the state-
ments of the child's mother, the police detective, and the child psychiatrist.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Southern Division, ruled
that these statements were indeed hearsay testimony and inadmissible for any
purpose. 19 However, the court noted that no attempt was made to establish
C.R.K.'s competence to testify and further stated while she was presumed
incompetent, she could have been qualified subject to the trial court's dis-
cretion if it were established that she had a present understanding of the
obligation to speak the truth, mental capacity at the time of the event to
observe and register the occurrence, memory sufficient to retain independent
recollection, and capacity to relate the occurrences.2' Because the court of
appeals in In re C.R.K. v. H.J.K. had refused to admit the testimony of the
child's mother, the police detective, and the child psychiatrist, holding it to
be hearsay and inadmissible for any purpose, there was no conclusive medical
or physical evidence. Thus, the submissibility of the case depended solely
upon the testimony of C.R.K., testimony which was never given. Had C.R.K.
been over 10 years of age, she would have been presumed competent to
testify under the Missouri statute. 2' Since she was but two and one-half years
18. Id. at 696.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 699.
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(2) (Supp. 1985). This provision modified the
common law presumption that a child was competent to testify at 14 years of age.
Case law requiring the "four point test" discussed in this Note is probably overruled
by section 491.060(2), which provides that children under 10 who are victims of sexual
abuse (and certain other enumerated crimes): "shall be allowed to testify without
qualification in any judicial proceeding involving such alleged offense. The trier of
fact shall be permitted to determine the weight and credibility to be given to the
testimony." Mo. R~v. STAT § 491.060(2). As a practical matter, there is a strong
possibility Missouri courts will continue to use some version of the four-point test
as a "measuring stick" to evaluate the probative value of children's testimony. See
State v. Young, 477 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1972); State v. Statler, 331 S.W.2d 525 (Mo.
1960); State v. Terry, 684 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
[Vol. 52
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old, her competency became a matter for the trial judge to decide by applying
the four-point test noted above.?
The first point-present understanding (upon instruction) of an obli-
gation to speak the truth-involves two separate sub-elements.? First, the
child must understand the meaning of truth, as opposed to falsehood; the
child must be able to distinguish fact from fantasy, true statements from
lies. Second, the child must understand that some form of legal and moral
disgrace attaches to the deliberate utterance of falsehood on the witness
stand.24
In practice, these two elements are often blended. The term "knowing
the meaning of-an oath" has been used to embrace both concepts embodied
in this first point of the four-point test. 2 However, a child who professes
ignorance of "the meaning of an oath" may still be adjudged competent if
it can be shown that the child in fact understands individually the two ele-
ments involved. 26 It should be stressed that more than a mere ability to
differentiate between truth and falsity is required. The child must display an
awareness of the consequences of lying under oath. As long as the child is
aware that some form of punishment will result, courts have generally been
lenient regarding the accuracy of the child's perception of what form the
punishment or sanction will take.27 A Georgia court held that a child's state-
ment that if she lied under oath she would "go to the devil" was sufficient. 28
In State v. Young,29 cited by the court in In re C.R.K. in support of its
holding that C.R.K. could have been qualified to testify, an eleven-year-old
girl who appeared to be of less than normal intelligence and who was con-
siderably behind her age group in school, was held to be competent although
admitting that she did not know what an oath was.?0 The girl stated that she
knew what it was to tell the truth, and what a lie was, and that if you tell
a lie "you get a whooping." Her testimony on deposition that she did not
know what it meant to tell the truth or what a lie is did not preclude her
trial testimony, since at the time of trial the trial court was convinced she
then knew the difference. 31
The second element of the four-point test, unlike the first, involves the
child's capacity at the time of the occurrence to accurately observe and
22. See State v. Beisnir, 646 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1983); State v. Young, 477
S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1972).
23. See Arnold v. State, 167 Ga. App. 720, 307 S.E.2d 526 (1983).
24. Id. at 721-22, 307 S.E.2d at 528.
25. Mackler v. State, 164 Ga. App. 874, 876, 298 S.E.2d 569, 591 (1982).
26. State v. Young, 477 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Mo. 1972).
27. Id. at 116.
28. Arnold v. State, 167 Ga. App. 720, 721, 307 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1983).
29. 477 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1972).
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register the events. While it has been stated that children under seven rarely
have the capacity to lie,32 children are generally more prone to suggestion
and influence than adults. Children may have difficulty distinguishing fact
from fantasy, and may be unable to form rational judgments or draw logical
conclusions about a sequence of events. 3 As one Missouri court stated:
The force of suggestion, always strong, is particularly potent with the impres-
sionable and plastic mind of childhood ... without intending any such
result, the repetition of supposed facts in the presence of a child often creates
a mental impression or conception that has no objective reality in any ac-
tually existing fact.3 4
The third element of the four-point test concerns the strength and ac-
curacy of the child's memory, or, as one Missouri court has stated, "the
sufficiency of the child's memory to bridge the period intervening between
the occurrence and the trial." 35 With children, as with adults, the greater the
time lapse, the more suspect the recollection. 6 In most Missouri cases, a
child's testimony from memory, pertaining to a crime committed upon the
person of the child, is accorded more weight than would testimony pertaining
merely to something which the child saw or observed. The theory is that the
trauma of personal violation and injury would naturally leave a deeper and
more lasting impression upon the child's mind.37 The recollection must be
an independent one.3 A lawyer conducting direct examination of a child is
generally permitted some freedom regarding prompting and leading ques-
tions.39 A defense lawyer may, depending on the strategic situation, delib-
erately refrain from objecting to prompting and leading questions, hoping
that the child's credibility to the trier of fact will be impaired. The child's
testimony will be much more effective if it is seen as the child's own, as a
truly independent, not prompted or memorized, recollection.4°
32. Silas, Would a Kid Lie? 71 A.B.A. J. 17 (Feb. 1985) (citing several re-
search studies generally concluding that the word of children can be believed, but
also mentioning that juries may not feel comfortable when relying on the testimony
of young children; corroborating evidence may play a key role in determining the
influence of children's statements).
33. Inker, Evidentiary Problems in Custody Trials, 6 F AmLY ADVOCATE 16
(1984) (citing F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, CROss-ExAHNATION IN CRMNAL TU:ALS
(1978)).
34. Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601, 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (quoting
People v. Delaney, 52 Cal. App. 765, 769, 199 P. 896, 900 (1921) and Cross v.
Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 67, 77 S.E.2d 447, 452 (1953)).
35. Id. at 609.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 611-12; Burnam v. Chicago Great W. R.R., 340 Mo. 25, 35, 100
S.W.2d 858, 862 (1936).
38. State v. Wilson, 554 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
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The fourth and final hurdle involves the child's ability to articulate his
or her testimony on the witness stand.4' The ease or difficulty of this will
vary greatly depending on the age and the individual child. The standard
does not appear to be inordinately high and is merely a requirement that the
child be able to relate the experience in his or her own words. This test calls
for a level of precision of expression appropriate to the child's age.42 It is
significant that the standard refers to words; this would seem to preclude a
demonstration by a very young child on the stand with anatomically correct
dolls in lieu of verbal articulation beyond his or her capabilities. Such a
demonstration might be allowed, however, as an accompaniment to oral
testimony. Under Missouri case law, the trial judge has broad discretion in
weighing the different factors which comprise the fourfold test. The judge's
decision whether to allow the child witness to testify would be overturned
only for clear abuse of discretion.4 3
In July 1985 an amendment to Missouri Revised Statutes section 491.060
was enacted, providing that children under ten who are alleged victims of
offenses under Chapters 565, 566, or 568 (child abuse and other crimes
against the person) shall be considered competent and allowed to testify
without qualification. 44 The previous statutory presumptions of incompetence
for children under ten has thus been removed. The trier of fact is permitted
to determine the weight and credibility of the testimony. The practical effect
is that the child victim of abuse will get a chance to be heard in court. Under
the former statute, a judge could rule the child incompetent under the four-
point test and in effect silence the child. This is no longer allowed, but it is
likely that the four-point test will continue in use, perhaps subconsciously,
as criteria of credibility for children's testimony.
41. State v. Edwards, 657 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. O'Neal,
651 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Grady, 649 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); State v. Smith, 641 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Russell,
642 S.W.2d 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
42. The standard has been variously described as "capacity to relate the oc-
currences," In re C.R.K., 672 S.W.2d at 699; "capacity truly to translate into words
the memory of such observation," State v. Sanders, 533 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976); "demonstrated capacity to verbally describe what happened to him at
the hands of the defendant," State v. Kennell, 605 S.W.2d 819, 819 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980); "capacity to articulate that memory," State v. Grady, 649 S.W.2d 240, 243
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983); "capacity truly to translate into words memory of observation,"
State v. Smith, 641 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo Ct. App. 1983); and "descriptive powers
to testify about crime." Id.
43. State v. Price, 513 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Mo. 1974); State v. Young, 477
S.W.2d 114, 116 (Mo. 1972); State v. Jones, 360 Mo. 723, 727, 230 S.W.2d 678, 680(1950); Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 354 Mo. 823, 834, 191 S.W.2d 653, 658
(1945).
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The "chance to be heard in court" may become more of a curse than
a blessing for the child involved and the parents; it may be little more than
a chance to undergo a trial by ordeal, with the dual intimidations of cross-
examination and the presence of the defendant abuser. There are better
alternatives.
In In re C.R.K., the juvenile office was unable to persuade the appeals
court to sustain the trial court order adjudging that H.J.K. abused his child:
the only evidence in the record supporting the father's responsibility for the
abuse was found to be hearsay by the appeals court and inadmissible for
any purpose. 45 The only alternative was for a two and one-half year old girl,
C.R.K., to take the stand. The appeals court stated that this might have been
permissible. 46 However, the little girl may have been unable or unwilling to
testify in open court just a few feet away from her alleged abuser, even
though her mother and psychologist may have permitted her to.
Missouri's position of not admitting hearsay evidence represents the
conservative, majority view.47 An increasing number of jurisdictions, how-
ever, are beginning to allow some use of hearsay, typically the kind of hearsay
which the juvenile office sought to introduce in In re C.R.K. Eleven states
have now adopted, by statute, a special hearsay exception designed to facil-
itate the successful prosecution of child abuse cases. 48 Most of these statutes
45. In re C.R.K., 672 S.W.2d 696.
46. Id. at 699.
47. Although Missouri represents the conservative majority view, there is a
clear trend, led by the federal courts, to admit evidence of child abuse cases under
various hearsay exceptions. Cf. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83-85 (8th
Cir. 1980) (child victim's description to doctor of sexual abuse admissible because
cause of injury was reasonably pertinent to treatment), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(physician allowed to testify as to child victim's statements of causation but not as
to statements concerning identity of the molester). It is arguable that in those states
which have adopted evidence codes based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, statements
such as those made by C.R.K. to the child psychologist might have been admissible
under FED. R. Evm. 803(4). Rule 803(4) provides: "Statements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" are
admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. (emphasis added). These may include
statements of a then existing physical state or statements of medical history or of
causation if "reasonably pertinent" to treatment or diagnosis, but would not include
statements as to fault. Id. (advisory committee's note); see also E. CLEARY, K. BROWN,
G. Dix, E. GELLHORN, D. KAYE, R.F. MEISENHOLDER, E. ROBERTS & J. STRONG,
McCORMICK ON EViDENCE § 292, at 839-40 (1972) [hereinafter McCoRMICK ON EvI-
DENCE]. If C.R.K. had talked to a doctor about the cause of her reddened vagina,
the physician's testimony might have been admissible under this provision, but Mis-
souri does not follow the Federal Rules of Evidence.
48. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1985); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-
411(3)(1985); I11. 83rd Gen. Assem. P.A. 83-1067 Sec. 115-10, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
[Vol. 52
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require that the child testify or be found unavailable, and that the court find
the statement to be "reliable." 49
In child sexual abuse cases, there are different approaches to a finding
of unavailability. Psychological harm caused by the abuse may fall into the
category of mental infirmity. 50 Failure of memory, refusal to testify (based
on threats of harm to the child by the defendant), and incompetency may
be other categories of unavailability.5' An Indiana statute creates a special
definition of unavailability for child sexual abuse victims.52 A psychiatrist
must certify that the child's participation in the trial would be a traumatic
experience, a doctor must certify that the child cannot participate in the trial
for medical reasons, or the court must determine that the child is incapable
of understanding the nature and obligation of an oath.53 In California, un-
availability of a child due to psychological harm must be established by expert
testimony.5 4 An "expert" for purposes of this statute may be a licensed
clinical social worker or licensed marriage, family, or child counselor, in
addition to the more orthodox categories such as physician, surgeon, psy-
chiatrist, and psychologist. 5
To protect the accused's constitutional right to confront witnesses, a
hearsay statement may be admitted only if it has sufficient "indicia of re-
liability. "56 Where the evidence falls into a firmly rooted hearsay exception,
37, para. 704-6(4)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-374-6 (Burns 1984);
IowA CODE § 232.96(6) (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1982); MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02(3) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-411 (1982); WASt. REv. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1982); VT. R. Evm 804a, 807.
See generally Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and
Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DicKiNSON L. REv.
645, 649-55 (1985) (article provides a comprehensive overview of all state legislation
establishing a special hearsay exception and discusses similarities and differences among
the statutes, as well as factors which determine the constitutionality of such legisla-
tion).
49. Bulkley, supra note 48, at 650.
50. McCoRMcK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47, § 253, at 753.
51. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1980) (failure of
memory), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505,
509, 668 P.2d 738, 746, 194 Cal Rptr. 431, 439 (1983); Warren v. United States, 436
A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981) (unavailability of witness due to mental infirmity encompassing
psychological harm; this case notes that nineteen states have statutes with mental
infirmity as a category of unavailability and includes an excellent discussion on psy-
chological harm from testifying as an unavailability basis for admitting prior testi-
mony); see, also, Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1035 (1984); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusal
to testify based on threats of harm to the child by the defendant).
52. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Bums 1984).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 431 (1983).
55. CAL. Evn. CODE § 240 (West 1986).
56. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
1987]
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such reliability may be presumed.17 Even if the statement does not fall into
the firmly rooted exception group, it may still be admitted if the statement
is shown to have certain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 58 In
Dutton v. Evans,5 9 The United States Supreme Court enumerated four criteria
used to test the trustworthiness of hearsay. The Dutton criteria are: the
statement contains no express assertion of past fact; cross-examination could
not show the declarant's lack of knowledge; the possibility of declarant's
faulty recollection is remote; and the circumstances surrounding the statement
are such that there is no reason to suppose the declarant misrepresented the
defendant's involvement. Courts have held that all four Dutton factors need
not be present in order to admit a statement over confrontation objections,
and in fact, if other factors indicate reliability, a statement need not satisfy
any of the elements. 60 In In re C.R.K. there was no apparent inherent un-
reliability in the hearsay testimony of the mother, the police detective, or
the child psychologist. Nevertheless, the court felt constrained by longstand-
ing precedent to refuse to admit the hearsay. Missouri could have followed
Indiana and chosen to enact a statutory hearsay exception tailored to fit the
child abuse situation. 6' Instead, in 1985, Missouri enacted the Child Victim
Witness Protection Law, permitting videotaped depositions to be introduced
into evidence.62 This statute, which will be considered below, appears to be
Missouri's response to the problem of prosecuting child abuse cases involving
children of "tender years." Although children of any age are now presumed
competent and allowed to testify "live" in child abuse cases, the use of
videotaping seems more desirable in that it would spare the child the trauma
of the personal appearance before the abuser and his attorney.
In adopting a statute allowing the videotaping of a child's testimony,
Missouri seems to be following the most common trend among the states in
recent years. 63 In 1982, four states allowed videotaped testimony. By early
1986, thirteen states had statutes permitting videotaped trial, preliminary
hearing or deposition testimony.64 The criteria among the states for admission
57. Id.
58. Id. It may be difficult for a prosecutor to establish trustworthiness. It is
always better to attempt to admit the hearsay statements of child sexual abuse victims
under one or more of the long-standing or accepted exceptions. This relieves the court
of the duty of making particularized findings of trustworthiness.
59. 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
61. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns 1984).
62. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 491.675-.693 (Supp. 1985).
63. Bulkley, supra note 48, at 657.
64. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251 to -4253 (1985); ARK STAT. ANN.
§§ 43-2033 to -2036 (Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1346-47 (West Supp. 1985);
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1983); FLA. STAT. §§ 92.53-.54 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Baldwin Supp. 1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205
(Supp. 1985); Mo. REv. STAT. § 573.050 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to
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of videotaped testimony varies. Some states permit videotaped testimony only
if the court finds that the child's testimony in open court would cause severe
emotional trauma. Others allow videotaped testimony if the court finds the
child to be "medically unavailable" because testimony would cause emotional
trauma, or otherwise "unavailable" as defined in a state's evidence code
sections relating to the admissibility of hearsay or prior testimony. Missouri
allows videotaped testimony on motion of the prosecuting attorney in any
case where a child has been allegedly abused. This gives the court discretion
to admit the videotaped recording for use as substantive evidence.65 The court
also has the power to exclude the defendant from the deposition proceedings
and to sequester the child from the view of the defendant during all pre-
and post-deposition matters. According to the statute, the judge is to consider
the elements of the offense charged, and the emotional or psychological
trauma the child would suffer if required to testify in court or if brought
into the presence of the defendant. 6
The objections to videotaped testimony are based on the defendant's
right to fair trial with due process,67 the right to confront witnesses, 61 and
the right to attend criminal trials. 69 Traditionally, it has been the fact finder's
job to evaluate the credibility of the alleged victim and other prosecution
witnesses by observing their demeanor on the witness stand. A videotape
may not capture subtle but important nuances in the witness' facial color
and expression. It may not pick up a quaver in the voice, a nervous gulp, a
downcast of the eyes, or a trembling which would otherwise be detectable
by a jury sitting a few feet away from the witness. These are important clues
by which a judge or jury assesses the credibility of a witness, and ought not
be diluted by a videotaping procedure which provides only an electronic
reproduction of the witness' demeanor. Anyone who has watched a baseball
game at the ballpark and has seen one on television knows that there is a
world of difference between "live" observation and looking at an image on
a screen. However, with modern high-fidelity techniques of visual image
recording and retrieval, the danger of the fact-finder being misled may be
outweighed by the harm to the child of being forced to testify in person.
The primary drawback of the videotaped testimony is that it thwarts the
defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation at trial. The right to con-
frontation is comprised of two elements. First, there is a right to a face-to-
face meeting with the accuser at trial, so that the jury may judge whether
-15-402 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§
23A-12-9 to -12-10 (Supp. 1984); TEx. Cem. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon
Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. § 967.04(7) (1985).
65. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 491.680(1) (Supp. 1985).
66. Id. §§ 491.680(2), .685.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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the witness is being truthful by observing the witness' demeanor while tes-
tifying in the presence of the one person who knows if he or she is being
truthful. Second, there is the right to cross-examine the adverse witness.
Although the United States Supreme Court has seemed to say that the right
to cross-examine is the real focus of the right of confrontation, 70 it has never
relinquished the requirement of face-to-face confrontation. Several cases im-
ply that the right of confrontation means the right to physically confront
the accuser at trial, unless the accuser is unavailable. 71
The question then becomes, what is "unavailable"? Dying declarations,
for example, are admissible partly because the declarant is actually physically
unable to testify in person.7 2 It is clear, however, that unavailability in the
context of the right of confrontation may be something less than physical
unavailability.73 The probability of the child-witness' traumatization by forced
physical confrontation with the defendant may constitute a kind of "medical
unavailability" which would satisfy this prong of the right to confrontation.74
The constitutionality of the introduction of videotaped testimony has been
the subject of numerous recent scholarly articles in legal literature,75 and will
not be explored in detail in this Note. However, if the sixth amendment
contemplates the right to a face-to-face, "live" physical confrontation with
the accusing witness in all cases excepting actual physical unavailability, then
there may be no alternative but to put a two-year-old on the stand. 76
The constitutionality of the Missouri Child Victim Witness Protection
Law has not yet been tested.77 In United States v. Benfield,78 the Eighth
Circuit held that an actual physical face-to-face confrontation was mandated
by the confrontation clause.79 In view of this decision, the Missouri statute
70. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 406-07 (1963).
71. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 315-18 (1974); Barder v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968).
72. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1985).
73. See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821-22 (8th Cir. 1979). Ben-field concerned a showing of unavailability based on psychological damage to a
witness and testimony via a two-way closed circuit television. The court acknowledged
that the damage to the witness which would result from her testimony in open court
was a basis for finding unavailability of a witness. This procedure, however, which
did not allow the defendant to actively participate in the televised deposition, violated
his sixth amendment right to confrontation. The video-tape procedure did not provide
the same guarantees of reliability that would be found if the defendant was allowed
a face-to-face confrontation with the witness. Id.
74. Bulkley, supra note 48, at 660.
75. See, e.g., Comment, Abandoning Trial by Ordeal: Missouri's New Vi-
deotaping Statute, 51 Mo. L. REv. 515 (1986).
76. Bulkley, supra note 48, at 661.
77. Comment, supra note 75, at 521.
78. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
79. Id. at 821.
[Vol. 52
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/14
1987] CHILD WITNESSES 219
may be unconstitutional. However, strong argument has been made that the
confrontation clause contemplates the "benign intimidation" of face-to-face
confrontation with an adult, which may help elicit truth; "malign intimi-
dation" when the witness is a frightened, psychologically ravaged child, would
serve to hinder the search for truth, thus defeating the rationale for requiring
such a confrontation. The application of a balancing test would tip the scales
in favor of protecting the child.8"
The use of closed-circuit television is another relatively new and untried
potential solution to the problem of balancing the rights of the accused and
society's interest in prosecuting child abusers. In contrast to the use of a
videotaped recording of a deposition or other testimony taken prior to the
trial, closed-circuit television would enable the testimony to be "live" in
every sense. The accused and accuser would be able to see and hear each
other during the proceedings, but they would not be physically present in
the same room. Some commentators feel this would produce the most ac-
ceptable balance between the conflicting rights of accuser and accused.8' It
is much less traumatic to the child than the traditional courtroom setting,
yet approximates most of the elements of physical presence. Therefore, closed-
circuit television may be more likely to pass constitutional muster than the
use of a previously-recorded videotape. As with the use of videotapes, care
must be taken to ensure that the mechanical aspects of the image and voice
transmission do not distort the witness' testimony. Camera angle, lighting,
use of makeup, and other techniques may present a problem of misleading
the jury. The visual clues which a jury uses to ascertain whether a witness
is telling the truth are subtle. If the camera does not faithfully reproduce
the demeanor of the witness, these subtle clues may be unavailable to the
jury.
The "child courtroom" is a special courtroom designed to produce a
satisfying balance between the conflicting requirements of protecting both
the alleged child abuser and the child victim who must testify for there to
be a realistic chance of conviction. First proposed in 1969 by David Libal,82
the "child courtroom" is designed to take a victim's testimony in an informal
and relaxed manner, while the child can see only four persons around him:
the judge, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and a "child examiner." The
"child examiner" would be a person trained in the subtleties of child behavior
and experienced in interviewing techniques. Such examiners would generally
be chosen from the ranks of clinical psychologists, psychiatric social workers,
80. See Comment, supra note 75, at 525.
81. See Note, supra note 5, at 1018 (author believes it strikes best balance
between state's interest and defendant's interest); cf. Comment, supra note 75, at 533(author believes the new Missouri statute could be of questionable constitutionality
if not used with caution).
82. See generally Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Of-fense in the Criminal Justice System , 15 WAYNE L. REv. 877 (1969).
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psychiatrists, probation officers, and child care' workers. They would be
instructed in legal procedure and rules of evidence, especially in matters
relevant to sex offenses. Libai contemplates that most or all of the actual
questioning of the child be done through the "child examiner." 3
The "child courtroom" is physically set up in such a way so as to
contribute to the security and psychological comfort of the child. The ac-
cused, the jury and the audience are seated behind a two-way mirror, sep-
arating them from the child but enabling them to see and hear everything
clearly. The accused is able to communicate with his counsel by electronic
means. The defense attorney can request brief pauses in the examination of
the child to consult with or advise her client, and normally such requests are
granted. One of the advantages of the "child courtroom," as opposed to
both videotaping and closed circuit television, is that the jury sees not a
distorted image on a video screen, but the actual child through the equivalent
of a clear glass window.
All of the alternative methods discussed above may be constitutionally
infirm. The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Benfield,8 stated that face-
to-face confrontation via a two-way closed circuit television might be con-
stitutional only under a showing of extraordinary circumstances, by agree-
ment of the parties, or if the procedure closely adheres to traditional courtroom
scenes.8" The Libai "child courtroom" is not an adherence to a traditional
courtroom scene, but has the advantage of allowing distortion-free viewing
by the jury, while shielding the child from the "malign" intimidation of the
accused. Allowing a previously recorded testimonial videotape at trial seems
to be subject to the greatest degree of constitutional objection, since there
is no opportunity for "live" cross-examination, and the image is subject to
the greatest distortion. Closed circuit television appears to present the best
balance as it simulates a "live" confrontation, except for actual physical
presence. The real issue seems to come down to this: Does the "benign
intimidation" tending to elicit truth from the usual adult witness become
"malign intimidation," frustrating the quest for truth and justice, when the
witness is a frightened, traumatized child abuse victim? Based upon common
sense, the answer seems an unqualified "yes." The Missouri Child Victim
Witness Protection Law,8" if constitutional, provides a solution to the di-
lemma which has confronted parents and prosecutors in Missouri.
Evidentiary problems in child abuse cases greatly hamper their prose-
cution. Yet the crime is one of the most heinous imaginable, and one which
jeopardizes this nation's greatest asset, her children. Given the nature of the
83. Id. at 1013.
84. 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979).
85. Id.
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crime, the testimony of the only witness-the victimized child-is essential.
But, understandably, many parents wish to spare their children the further
trauma of testifying in court. It is ironic that a system which is supposed to
uphold the rights of the victim ends up causing further victimization. The
Missouri Legislature has responded to this serious problem by passage of the
Child Victim Witness Protection Law. Also, a child of any age, without
qualification, may now testify in court. The court in In re C.R.K. had no
alternative, under the law then in effect, but to suggest that the two-year-
old victim could be qualified under the four-point test to testify in person.
While the court's intentions were laudable, the legislature's passage of the
Witness Protection law provides a much better solution, a way out of the
dilemma. A child abuser must not go unpunished, but neither should a two-
year-old take the stand. If videotapes of the victim's testimony are consti-
tutionally admissible, then neither unpalatable alternative is necessary.
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